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consumption is a leading driver of infectious disease. Wildlife sales at wet markets, bushmeat 
hunting, and concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) are all exceptionally risky 
activities that facilitate disease spread and impose immense harms on human populations. If 
there is a moral duty to vaccinate, we also should recognize a moral duty to avoid most meat. 
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Infectious disease outbreaks have increased in recent decades, prompting calls for more 
aggressive measures to prevent them.1 The devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic emphasizes 
the urgency of that task, while putting greater scrutiny on activities that heighten infectious 
disease risk. In particular, COVID-19 highlights the link between meat consumption and 
infectious disease. Like most emerging infectious diseases today,2 COVID-19 is zoonotic—the 
virus causing it jumped from an animal to human host. Evidence suggests a Chinese wet market 
selling wildlife facilitated the emergence of this novel disease.3 Wildlife at wet markets have 
been linked to the emergence of other zoonotic diseases like SARS.4 The latest outbreak renewed 
calls to end wildlife sales, as well as limit other meat consumption linked to disease spread.5   
 Given such concerns, this article examines to what extent there is a moral duty to avoid 
meat based solely on a concern for human welfare and preventing infectious disease. I argue for 
this duty by appealing to a relevant analogy: the duty to vaccinate. For reasons of preventing 
individual harm, avoiding complicity in collective harm, and fairness, many ethicists recognize 
an individual duty to vaccinate.6 These same grounds establish a duty to avoid buying and eating 
most meat sold today. Wildlife sales at wet markets, bushmeat hunting, and concentrated animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs) all are exceptionally risky activities that facilitate disease spread 
and pose immense harms to human populations.7 If there is a moral duty to vaccinate, we also 
                                               
1 Smith, K., Goldberg, M., Rosenthal, S., Carlson, L., Chen, J., Chen, C., & Ramachandran, S. (2014).  
 Global rise in human infectious disease outbreaks. Journal of the Royal Society Interface. 11(101), 20140950.  
2 Ibid: 3.  
3 Anderson, K., Rambaut, A., Lipkin, W., Holmes, E., & Garry, R. (2020). The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. 
Nature Medicine. 26, 450–455.  
4 Woo, P., Lau, S., & Kwok-yung, Y. (2006). Infectious diseases emerging from Chinese wet-markets: Zoonotic 
origins of severe respiratory viral infections. Current Opinion in Infectious Diseases. 19(5), 401–407. 
5 E.g., Samuel, S. (2020, April 22). The meat we eat is a pandemic risk, too. Vox. Retrieved from 
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2020/4/22/21228158/coronavirus-pandemic-risk-factory-farming-meat. 
6 See Giubilini, A. (2019). The Ethics of Vaccination. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
7 See Greger, M. (2007). The human/animal interface: Emergence and resurgence of zoonotic infectious diseases. 
Critical Reviews in Microbiology. 33(4), 243–299.  
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should recognize a moral duty to avoid most meat. The article closes by considering this duty’s 
implications for policy.  
 I take no position here on whether nonhuman animals merit moral concern. They very 
well may, which would further strengthen the case against most meat consumption. But I avoid 
relying on that claim to show that, even with unfavorable assumptions, there still are compelling 
reasons for a duty to avoid most meat.8  
 
Infectious Disease, Ethics, and Risk 
Because of the suffering infectious diseases cause, we clearly have some moral duty to reduce 
the risk of their spread. Releasing a deadly and contagious pathogen in a crowded subway, for 
instance, is obviously wrong. The extent of this duty is difficult to specify given the numerous 
factors impacting infectious disease risk—travel, species loss, deforestation, medical innovation, 
public health policy, sanitation, farming, urbanization, and others.9 Ordinary activities like 
visiting the store carry some risk of spreading infectious disease. It quickly becomes apparent 
that an unqualified duty to reduce the risk of infectious disease is too demanding.10 
 Strategies to determine permissible and impermissible risk in other contexts help clarify 
duties regarding infectious disease. Consider drunk driving, which most readily recognize as 
wrong. Though driving generally imposes risks on others, drunk driving stands out as 
impermissible because its risks are:  
(1) exceptionally high: driving drunk is far likelier to cause harm than driving sober  
                                               
8 For a similar approach focused on meat consumption’s environmental consequences, see Ilea, R. (2009). Intensive 
livestock farming: Global trends, increased environmental concerns, and ethical solutions. Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics. 22(2), 153–167. 
9 See Shah, S. (2016). Pandemic: Tracking contagions from cholera to Ebola and beyond. New York: Picador. 
10 Verweij, M. (2005). Obligatory precautions against infection. Bioethics. 19(4), 323–335, p. 326.  
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(2) unnecessary: other options provide travel without excluding essential goods  
(3) grave: driving drunk can result in severe injuries or death11  
Remove any of these criteria and the moral case against an action becomes less compelling. 
Driving sober to an amusement park is unnecessary and comes with grave risks, but the risks are 
not exceptionally high and thus permissible. Driving an emergency vehicle at high speed comes 
with exceptionally high and grave risks, but permissible when necessary to achieve the essential 
good of saving someone’s life. Driving a bumper car is unnecessary and poses an exceptionally 
high risk of accident, but permissible since such accidents do not cause grave harms. In contrast, 
drunk driving is exceptionally risky, unnecessary, and a potential source of grave harms, which 
together render it morally impermissible. 
Importantly, (1) refers to an exceptionally high risk relative to activities achieving similar 
ends. In isolation, such a risk may appear quite low. Drunk driving in the US leads to a fatal 
accident in less than one out of every 10,000 cases.12 Yet that seemingly low risk fails to justify 
drunk driving, for what matters morally is how the risk compares to driving sober. A likelihood 
of accident nearly seven times greater for drunk driving makes clear its impermissibility.13   
The criteria also are not strictly dichotomous. There are degrees to which risks are 
exceptionally high, unnecessary, or grave. For example, whether a risk is unnecessary may be 
unclear because the alternative requires sacrificing important goods whose essential status is 
disputed. The hardship required in upholding the duty raises questions on whether it still applies. 
                                               
11 Criteria are modified from Huemer, M. (2019). Dialogues on ethical vegetarianism. New York: Routledge, p. 19. 
12 Calculation comes from 2014 data estimating 111,000,000 drunk driving episodes with 9,417 fatal crashes. See 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020). Impaired driving: Get the facts. Retrieved from 
https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv_factsheet.html; National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration. (2016). Traffic safety facts 2014 data: State alcohol-impaired-driving estimates. Retrieved 
from https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812264. 
13 Compton, R., & Beming, A. (2015). Drug and alcohol crash risk. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. Retrieved from https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/812117-
drug_and_alcohol_crash_risk.pdf, p. 5. 
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Such tough cases are common in moral reasoning and do not render the above criteria useless. 
For when clearly met, the criteria offer clarity on our duties. Applying these criteria to infectious 
disease risk helps distinguish permissible and impermissible forms of it. That approach guides 
the rest of the article as it focuses on two major sources of infectious disease risk: meat 
consumption and not vaccinating. 
 
The Duty to Vaccinate 
Vaccines represent one of medicine’s most significant innovations, responsible for eliminating 
diseases that once ravaged human populations. Most directly, vaccines reduce the risk of 
infection to those vaccinated. The protection ends there for vaccines for non-communicable 
diseases like tetanus. But vaccines for communicable diseases like measles have an added 
benefit: they reduce the risk that those vaccinated will infect others. When enough people in a 
population get vaccinated for a communicable disease, the resulting herd immunity prevents 
disease outbreaks and helps protect those unable to get vaccines, like infants and the 
immunosuppressed.14 Citing the vital public health role played by vaccines for dangerous 
communicable diseases, a growing consensus of ethicists argue that individuals have a moral 
duty to get such vaccines for themselves and their children when shown to be safe and 
effective.15  
                                               
14 Fine, P., Eames, K., & Heymann, D. (2011). “Herd immunity”: A rough guide. Clinical Infectious Diseases. 
52(7), 911–916.  
15 Navin, M. (2013). Resisting moral permissiveness about vaccine refusal. Public Affairs Quarterly. 27(1), 69–85; 
Flanigan, J. (2014). A defense of compulsory vaccination. HEC Forum. 26(1), 5–25; Brennan, J. (2018). A 
libertarian case for mandatory vaccination. Journal of Medical Ethics. 44(1), 37–43; Giubilini, A., Douglas, T., & 
Savulescu, J. (2018). The moral obligation to be vaccinated: Utilitarianism, contractualism, and collective easy 
rescue. Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy. 21(4), 547–560; Pierik, R. (2018). Mandatory vaccination: An 
unqualified defence. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 35(2), 381–398; Giubilini, A. (2020). An argument for 
compulsory vaccination: The taxation analogy. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 37(3), 446–466.  
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 There is a strong case for this duty because of the risks it guards against. Not vaccinating 
imposes exceptionally high risks compared to vaccinating. Lower vaccination rates lead to 
outbreaks of preventable diseases like measles, highlighting the comparably high risks of not 
vaccinating.16 These risks also are unnecessary, since people generally can get safe and effective 
vaccines without sacrificing essential goods and at little cost. Lastly, not vaccinating imposes 
grave risks on others—long-term adverse health effects and death. According to estimates by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and World Health Organization, measles alone 
causes over 100,000 deaths annually worldwide.17  
Given these risks, there are several rationales for the duty to vaccinate: (1) prevent 
individual harm, (2) avoid complicity in collective harm, and (3) fairness. Let’s look at each.  
 (1) Prevent individual harm. Someone who gets vaccinated reduces their risk of 
spreading infectious disease. That risk viewed in isolation is small. Still, not vaccinating comes 
with greater risk that easily could be avoided. Some who forgo vaccinations for nonmedical 
reasons end up infecting vulnerable individuals unable to get vaccinated.18 A wide range of 
normative theories agree that individuals should avoid imposing grave risks on others without 
their consent, which helps explain the duty to get vaccinated for communicable diseases.19 
 (2) Avoid complicity in collective harm. When many refuse vaccines, what results is a 
susceptible population in which disease can easily spread. Together such actions impose 
substantial and harmful risks on others, violating the principle to avoid complicity in collective 
harm. For instance, it is wrong to join a murderous mob, even if one’s participation has no 
                                               
16 Olive, J., Hotez, P., Damania, A., & Nolan, M. (2018). The state of the antivaccine movement in the United 
States: A focused examination of nonmedical exemptions in states and counties. PLOS Medicine. 15(6), e1002578.  
17 Patel, M., Dumolard, L., Nedelec, Y., Sodha, S., Steulet, C., Gacic-Dobo, M., … Goodson, J. (2019). Progress 
toward regional measles elimination—worldwide, 2000–2018. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 68(48), 
1105–1111, pp. 1108, 1110.  
18 Pierik, op. cit. note 15, p. 387. 
19 Flanigan, op. cit. note 15. 
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impact on the ultimate outcome. Not vaccinating also involves complicity in collective harm, 
suggesting a duty to vaccinate.20 
 (3) Fairness. High vaccination rates offer herd immunity, a public good that reduces the 
risk of infection for everyone in a population. Beyond just enjoying this benefit, individuals 
should contribute their fair share to maintaining it, which they can do by getting vaccinated. This 
basic idea of fairness bolsters the case for the duty to vaccinate.21 
 Altogether, these explanations offer broadly shared reasons for the duty to vaccinate. It is 
best understand as a pro tanto duty—it applies in most cases, but could be overridden in certain 
circumstances.22 If someone is immunosuppressed and getting a vaccine would endanger their 
health, that consideration overrides the duty to vaccinate. This person not getting vaccinated still 
imposes risks on others, but the risks are necessary to safeguard their health and thus 
permissible. Prohibitively high vaccine costs also could override the duty to vaccinate for those 
unable to afford it.  
 Despite support among ethicists for a duty to vaccinate, there remain objections to it, with 
perhaps the strongest being that the basic human right freedom of conscience overrides it. On 
this view, those with religious or philosophical objections to vaccines have no obligation to get 
them. Vaccine refusal on these grounds imposes risks on others that perhaps seem necessary—
they are an unavoidable side effect of exercising a basic right. But there is reason to question that 
view. Though freedom of conscience merits consideration, it is not absolute. Obviously, it does 
not mint permissions for drunk driving, murder, or many other harmful acts. Freedom of 
                                               
20 Brennan, op. cit. note 15. 
21 Giubilini, op. cit. note 15. 
22 Giubilini et al., op. cit. note 15, p. 549. 
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conscience necessarily ends when it imposes impermissible risks and harms on others, as in the 
case of refusing safe and effective vaccines critical to prevent communicable diseases.23  
 
Link Between Meat and Infectious Disease 
Just as not vaccinating poses exceptionally high, unnecessary, and grave risks of infectious 
disease, the same is true for many practices related to meat consumption. These practices prove 
risky due to animals’ role in infectious disease spread. Human-animal interactions carry the risk 
of pathogens spreading from animal hosts to human populations—a risk that increases with more 
interactions. Not surprisingly, the domestication of animals for farming played a significant role 
in the emergence of many infectious diseases. Influenza A, measles, smallpox, and tuberculosis 
all are zoonotic diseases that likely originated from domesticated animals.24 Today, zoonotic 
diseases are emerging at an accelerated pace. Leading drivers of this trend include more 
intensive animal farming and hunting, in conjunction with deforestation and development that 
bring humans into increased contact with wildlife.25 We turn now to some of the riskiest 
practices: (1) wildlife sales at wet markets, (2) bushmeat hunting, and (3) CAFOs. 
 
(1) Wildlife Sales at Wet Markets 
Asian wet markets offer an alternative to supermarkets, where independent vendors sell items 
valued for their perceived freshness. It has been common for some wet markets to sell live wild 
animals—bats, pangolins, civet cats, and others. Packing together many exotic species in close 
                                               
23 For more on conscientious objection to vaccines, see Clarke, S., Giubilini, A., & Walker, M. (2017). 
Conscientious objection to vaccination. Bioethics. 31(3), 155–161.  
24 Wolfe, N., Dunavan, C., & Diamond, J. (2007). Origins of major human infectious diseases. Nature. 447, 279–
283.  
25 Woolhouse, M., & Gowtage-Sequeria, S. (2005). Host range and emerging and reemerging pathogens. Emerging 
Infectious Diseases. 11(12), 1842–1847.  
8 
proximity creates ideal conditions for pathogens to jump between animals and evolve in novel 
ways that infect humans. As Patrick Woo, Susanna Lau, and Kwok-yung Yuen explain, 
animals are closely packed in cages and hygienic conditions are inevitably poor, with the 
shedding of large amounts of animal excreta. These animal excreta may contain high 
concentrations of zoonotic microbes of potential hazard to human health. High-risk 
behaviors of customers, such as blowing the cloacae of chickens commonly practised to 
examine their healthiness, further increase the risk of transmission of these potential 
microbes. All these factors contribute to the role of these wet-markets as a unique place 
for transmission of zoonotic disease to humans.26  
 
Wet markets received much attention following the outbreak of COVID-19, since the 
first cases were linked to one in Wuhan, China. But the risks have been known for some time. 
Infectious disease experts linked wildlife sales at wet markets to the earlier SARS outbreak and 
warned about their dangers. All this evidence suggests that wildlife sales pose exceptionally 
high, unnecessary, and grave risks. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted that point, and led 
many in China and elsewhere to call for an end to wildlife sales at wet markets.27 
  
(2) Bushmeat Hunting 
Another risky activity is the hunting and trade of bushmeat from Africa. Bushmeat hunting is 
conducive to the emergence and spread of infectious disease because it involves animals that 
rarely come in contact with humans. It thus can expose hunters and others to pathogens that 
previously only dwelled in animal hosts. Species hunted for bushmeat include nonhuman 
primates, source of a disproportionate share of zoonotic diseases. Due to their genetic similarity, 
nonhuman primates often carry microbes well suited to survive in humans, which makes hunting 
                                               
26 Woo et al., op. cit. note 4, p. 403. 
27 Daly, N. (2020, January 30). Chinese citizens push to abolish wildlife trade as coronavirus persists. National 
Geographic. Retrieved from https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2020/01/china-bans-wildlife-trade-after-
coronavirus-outbreak/. 
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them hazardous to public health.28 Scientists have traced outbreaks of Ebola, monkeypox, and 
other infectious diseases back to bushmeat. One of the deadliest pandemics, AIDS, likely 
originated from a virus contracted through hunting, preparing, or consuming primate bushmeat.29 
  As with wildlife sales at wet markets, the exceptionally high and grave risks associated 
with bushmeat hunting are well documented. These risks may be necessary when people have 
limited access to food and bushmeat is their only option. But demand for bushmeat persists even 
where it is clearly unnecessary, like Europe and the US, popular destinations for illegal imports 
of bushmeat.30 Surveys also find that some higher-income households in Africa prefer and 
purchase bushmeat, despite its risks and the availability of other food options.31  
 
(3) Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) 
It is tempting to conclude from the last two examples that only activities related to exotic meat 
consumption pose significant risks of infectious disease. Those in the developed world who buy 
beef, chicken, and pork at the supermarket are not to blame. But that conclusion is mistaken, 
since the vast majority of meat in the US and many other countries comes from intensive animal 
farming, in particular CAFOs or factory farms.32 These farms produce meat cheaply but also 
                                               
28 Wolfe et al., op. cit. note 24, p. 282. 
29 Greger, op. cit. note 7, pp. 247–248. 
30 Chaber, A.-L., Allebone-Webb, S., Lignereux, Y., Cunningham, A., & Rowcliffe, J. (2010). The scale of illegal 
meat importation from Africa to Europe via Paris. Conservation Letters. 3(5), 317–323; Smith, K., Anthony, S., 
Switzer, W., Epstein, J., Seimon, T., Jia, H., … Marano, N. (2012). Zoonotic viruses associated with illegally 
imported wildlife products. PLOS One. 7(1), e29505. 
31 Ordaz-Németh, I., Arandjelovic, M., Boesch, L., Gatsio, T., Grimes, T., Kuehl, H., … Junker, J. (2017). The 
socio-economic drivers of bushmeat consumption during the West African Ebola crisis. PLOS Neglected Tropical 
Diseases. 11(3), e0005450.  
32 Anthis, J. (2019, April 11). US factory farming estimates. Sentience Institute. Retrieved from 
https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/us-factory-farming-estimates. These estimates are based on data from United 
States Department of Agriculture (2019). 2017 census of agriculture. Retrieved from 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/index.php#full_report. 
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greatly increase the risk of infectious disease. Various practices of CAFOs raise that risk, with 
two that stand out: packing many animals tightly together and nontherapeutic use of antibiotics.33  
In the dense confines of CAFOs, with many susceptible hosts constantly exposed to their 
waste, pathogens have more opportunities to infect animals, mutate into more virulent forms, and 
spread through a population than in the wild. Intensive animal farming also favors breeds that 
grow large quickly, and this reduced genetic diversity leaves herds less resistant to disease 
outbreaks. Moreover, the conditions animals endure in CAFOs—from tight confinement to 
operations without anesthesia (like beak trimming)—subject them to stress that makes them 
more prone to disease.34  
To counteract unhealthy conditions, prevent disease, and promote growth, many CAFOs 
give animals subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics through food or water. Most antibiotics 
consumed in the US go toward farm animals and globally their use is increasing with the growth 
of intensive animal farming.35 As studies of farmworkers and meat find, nontherapeutic use of 
antibiotics in agriculture selects for strains of bacteria resistant to drugs.36 Antimicrobial 
resistance is a serious public health problem that worldwide kills hundreds of thousands of 
people annually and, if trends continue, will kill millions annually in the coming decades.37 
CAFOs significantly contribute to this problem and expose populations to resistant pathogens via 
farmworkers, meat sold to consumers, and animal waste that pollutes water, air, soil, and crops.38 
                                               
33 Silbergeld, E., Graham, J., & Price, L. (2008). Industrial food animal production, antimicrobial resistance, and 
human health. Annual Review of Public Health. 29, 151–169, p. 153. 
34 Greger, op. cit. note 7, pp. 253–254. 
35 Van Boeckel, T., Brower, C., Gilbert, M., Grenfell, B., Levin, S., Robinson, T., … Laxminarayan, R. (2015). 
Global trends in antimicrobial use in food animals. PNAS. 112(18), 5649–5654. 
36 Silbergeld et al., op cit. note 33. 
37 O’Neill, J. (2016). Tackling drug-resistant infections globally: Final report and recommendations. The Review 
on Antimicrobial Resistance. Retrieved from https://amr-
review.org/sites/default/files/160518_Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf, pp. 10–12. 
38 Silbergeld et al., op cit. note 33, pp. 158–161. 
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Numerous infectious disease outbreaks have been traced back to CAFOs. In Malaysia in 
the 1990s, a deadly outbreak of the Nipah virus—which caused respiratory illness and had a 
fatality rate of 40%—hit the human population due to contact with intensively farmed pigs.39 
Drug-resistant pathogens like MRSA are becoming more widespread in human populations and 
their high concentrations on livestock and meat strongly suggest that intensive animal farming is 
a significant driver of this trend.40 The growth of intensive poultry farming has proved conducive 
for avian influenza to mutate into more deadly forms, like H5N1 that kills around half the people 
it infects.41 The swine flu pandemic of 2009 originated from a virus circulating among 
intensively farmed pigs, which then infected millions of people and killed thousands.42 The 
continued increase in CAFOs only exacerbates the risk of more frequent and deadly outbreaks in 
the future. 
 
The Duty to Avoid Most Meat 
The risky practices identified above, and particularly intensive animal farming, are responsible 
for most meat consumed worldwide.43 Given current practices, the same reasons offered for the 
duty to vaccinate—(1) prevent individual harm, (2) avoid complicity in collective harm, and (3) 
fairness—also support a duty to avoid most meat.  
First, when someone buys, hunts, or cooks meat from risky sources, their contact with it 
increases the risk of infecting others. To prevent direct harm to others, they should avoid such 
                                               
39 Greger, M. (2010). Industrial animal agriculture’s role in the emergence and spread of disease. In J. D’Silva & J. 
Webster, The meat crisis: Developing more sustainable production and consumption (pp. 161–172). New York: 
Earthscan, pp. 162–63. 
40 Ibid: 163–64. 
41 Ibid: 164–65. 
42 Ibid: 165–66. 
43 Anthis, K. (2019, February 21). Global farmed & factory farmed animals estimates. Sentience Institute. Retrieved 
from https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/global-animal-farming-estimates; Greger, op. cit. note 7, p. 253. 
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actions. Second, wildlife sales at wet markets, bushmeat hunting, and CAFOs impose collective 
and impermissible harms on others. We have reason to avoid meat from those sources because it 
involves complicity in collective harm. Third, a collective shift away from risky meat provides 
the public good of reduced infectious disease risk. Buying and eating such meat represents a 
failure to contribute our fair share to this public good. While the public good of herd immunity 
provided by vaccination protects against known diseases, the public good provided by avoiding 
risky meat includes protection against the emergence of novel diseases. If a disease never enters 
the human population, we lack a concrete sense of the suffering prevented. Still, that public good 
is incredibly important. Proven vaccines and treatments initially are unavailable for novel 
diseases, which makes them especially dangerous and preventing them critical.  
So reasons of preventing individual harm, avoiding complicity in collective harm, and 
fairness all point to the same conclusion: individuals have a duty to avoid most meat. This duty, 
like the duty to vaccinate, is best understood as a pro tanto duty, meaning it sometimes can be 
overridden. If refusing risky meat endangers life because no other food is available, the duty no 
longer applies. In this case, eating meat to survive imposes a necessary risk on others.  
Those with other food options most clearly have a duty to avoid meat from the riskiest 
sources—wildlife from wet markets, bushmeat hunting, and CAFOs. Now does this duty require 
giving up all meat? Since the duty is grounded in a concern for human rather than animal 
welfare, it allows the consumption of species posing a low risk of zoonotic disease. For example, 
pathogens rarely jump from fish to humans due to the considerable genetic differences between 
them.44 So eating wild-caught fish appears compatible with avoiding risky meat. Farmed fish is 
                                               
44 Woolhouse, M., & Gaunt, E. (2007). Ecological origins of novel human pathogens. Critical Reviews in 
Microbiology. 33(4), 231–242, p. 237. 
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more questionable, given the nontherapeutic use of antibiotics to produce it and its link to 
zoonotic disease spread and antimicrobial resistance.45  
How about meat from farm animals raised in conditions less risky than CAFOs? Long 
before CAFOs, human contact with domesticated animals gave rise to various zoonotic 
diseases.46 Perhaps, then, the duty to avoid most meat should extend to all meat from mammals 
and birds—sources of the vast majority of zoonotic diseases.47 At the same time, this duty is 
grounded in the idea of avoiding activities that pose exceptionally high risks of infectious 
disease. Does producing and consuming truly free-range meat, without antibiotics, fall into that 
category? It poses some risk, but maybe not an exceptionally high one. On that view, giving up 
free-range meat counts as a supererogatory rather than morally required act. 
 Since most action imposes some harmful risk on others, it is difficult to know where to 
draw the line between permissible and impermissible risk. Fortunately, determining that in every 
case isn’t necessary to establish the duty to avoid most meat. We can lack certainty in marginal 
cases and still identify the riskiest activities to avoid. Even if the implications for the duty 
defended here are unclear for free-range meat, its prohibition against meat from riskier sources—
most meat consumed today—is clear.   
 
Objections 
Here is the argument so far:  
(1) If there is a pro tanto duty to vaccinate, there is a pro tanto duty to avoid most meat.  
(2) There is a pro tanto duty to vaccinate. 
                                               
45 Greger, op. cit. note 7, pp. 255, 258. 
46 Wolfe et al., op. cit. note 24, p. 281. 
47 Woolhouse & Gaunt, op. cit. note 44, p. 237. 
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(3) So there is a pro tanto duty to avoid most meat. 
The argument is valid but faces potential objections to each premise, which we now consider. 
 
Objections to Premise (1) 
Some may reject the duty to vaccinate as an analogy for other duties due to worries that it proves 
too much. Many activities marginally raise the risk of infectious disease, from travel to living in 
a city, and expecting people to stop them all is too demanding.  
 The duty to vaccinate does imply duties beyond just avoiding most meat. Other plausible 
duties include avoiding certain exotic pets, travel during epidemics, and activities that contribute 
significantly to deforestation. Accepting such duties does not entail that individuals have a duty 
to avoid any activity that marginally increases the risk of infectious disease. Indeed, we make 
similar distinctions all the time. Driving drunk and driving sober both impose risks on others, but 
the former is impermissible because its risks are exceptionally high, unnecessary, and grave. 
Wildlife sales at wet markets, bushmeat hunting, and CAFOs are the equivalent of drunk driving, 
which is why there is a moral duty to avoid meat from those sources. 
 So the analogy between the two duties does not prove too much, but perhaps it fails for 
another reason: avoiding most meat involves greater sacrifices than getting vaccinated. Consider 
that over 90% of Americans get vaccinated,48 while only 5% are vegetarian.49 Policies to 
promote vaccinations—like subsidies and banning children without vaccinations from attending 
                                               
48 Seither, R., Loretan, C., Driver, K., Mellerson, J., Knighton, C., & Black, C. (2019). Vaccination coverage with 
selected vaccines and exemption rates among children in kindergarten—United States, 2018–19 school year. 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 68(41), 905–912.  
49 Hrynowski, Z. (2019, September 27). What percentage of Americans are vegetarian? Gallup. Retrieved from 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/267074/percentage-americans-vegetarian.aspx. 
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school—may partly explain this disparity, but not all of it. If current behavior is any indication, 
giving up most meat may be too onerous. 
Whether a duty is too onerous depends on factors beyond just how many people dislike it. 
Paying taxes is unpopular, yet that fails to discredit the duty to pay them. One has to look at what 
makes a purported duty seem onerous and whether those concerns disqualify it as a legitimate 
duty. For the duty to avoid most meat, common concerns include that it interferes with people’s 
taste preferences, health, cultural values, and economic welfare. Ultimately, all these concerns 
prove unpersuasive: satisfying taste preferences is not an essential need that justifies 
impermissible risks to others; diets with little or no meat provide health benefits;50 meat’s 
cultural significance deserves consideration but fails to mint permissions to impose 
impermissible risks on others; and vegetarian diets cost less.51 
It is important to note one objection that holds up under scrutiny. The duty defended here 
implies that those who sell wildlife, hunt bushmeat, or work in CAFOs should stop given these 
activities’ impermissible risks. That demand is onerous for those without alternatives for income 
or food. Though this concession leaves the duty defended here intact for most people, especially 
in the developed world, it highlights the need for policies that ease the duty’s burdens on those in 
precarious conditions where their welfare depends on meat from risky sources.   
 
Objections to Premise (2) 
Another line of attack questions the duty to vaccinate, aiming to undermine it along with the duty 
to avoid most meat. Skeptics of these duties emphasize the inefficacy of individual action: one’s 
                                               
50 Melina, V., Winston, C., & Levin, S. (2016). Position of the academy of nutrition and dietetics: Vegetarian diets. 
Journal of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics. 116(12), 1970–1980.  
51 Flynn, M., & Schiff, A. (2015). Economical healthy diets (2012): Including lean animal protein costs more than 
using extra virgin olive oil. Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition. 10(4), 467–482.  
16 
decision to forgo vaccination has virtually no impact on the risks others face. It is difficult to 
show that such action will be the tipping point that lowers herd immunity and causes an 
outbreak. Though collectively vaccine refusal imposes substantial risks, our inability to trace 
these risks back to a particular person casts doubt on the individual duty to vaccinate.52  
 There are several ways to respond. Most obviously, we can trace some risks back to 
individual decisions not to vaccinate. Someone who refuses vaccination is more likely to infect 
individuals who cannot get vaccines for medical reasons. These risks are low viewed in isolation, 
but high compared to the alternative of getting vaccinated. 
Some dismiss this response, claiming that the risks in question are too small to establish 
individual duties. Still, the defender of these duties can point to other reasons for them: by not 
vaccinating, we become complicit in collective harms and fail to do our fair share to prevent 
them. The skeptic can counter that we have duties to avoid complicity in grave intentional harms 
(e.g., lynching), but not grave unintentional harms (e.g., not vaccinating).53  
Though complicity in intentional harm deserves greater blame than complicity in 
unintentional harm, all else being equal, it is a mistake to categorically reject duties to avoid the 
latter. Drunk driving rarely involves harmful intent, yet we recognize a moral duty to avoid it. 
The same holds for actions contributing to unintentional collective harm whose individual risks 
are tougher to pinpoint. Take the emission of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Individuals have a 
moral duty to avoid CFC emissions given their significant harms to the ozone layer, even if one 
person’s emissions have no measurable impact.  
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The law bans CFCs, the skeptic might note, which explains the moral duty against them 
but not against vaccine refusal where legal.54 But this view runs into problems. If moral duties 
hinge on whether individual action poses concrete harm, as the skeptic claims, there is nothing 
wrong with secret emission of CFCs that carefully avoids undermining legal compliance by 
others. In other words, it is permissible to emit CFCs and break similar laws as long as no one 
finds out. That seems implausible. The skeptic could claim that individuals should obey laws like 
bans on CFCs because, in practice, breaking them almost always has the effect of discouraging 
their observance. But that claim is questionable. Plus, why would there be any less of a duty to 
avoid legal activities contributing to collective harm—like not vaccinating—since breaking that 
duty could encourage others to do the same? In sum, there are persuasive reasons to reject 
skepticism toward the duty to vaccinate and other duties to avoid contributing to exceptionally 
high, unnecessary, and grave risks on others. 
 
Policy Implications  
The duty to vaccinate suggests another duty: not buying and eating most meat sold today. This 
individual duty seeks to promote a public good—lower overall infectious disease risk—that only 
can be achieved through collective action. It is here that law and policy have a role. Though 
detailed policy prescriptions are beyond this article’s scope, it is worth considering what the duty 
to avoid most meat implies for policy. 
Scientists overwhelmingly agree that intensive animal farming is a leading cause of 
increased infectious disease outbreaks. Most also assume that CAFOs are here to stay, so they 
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propose more surveillance, like testing farmworkers and livestock for pathogens.55 Given risky 
conditions throughout the world, governments and international bodies should expand 
surveillance to help prevent future outbreaks.  
 Yet that approach is dissatisfying as a long-term solution. More surveillance without 
addressing the root causes of infectious disease resembles an ever more elaborate game of 
whack-a-mole, in which we desperately try to fend off threats emerging at a quickening pace. It 
is a game we are at real danger of losing—and have been losing. Devastating outbreaks continue 
despite expansions in infectious disease surveillance in recent decades.56 
 In this context, there is value in reframing most meat consumption as analogous to not 
vaccinating, for it captures a critical point: meat is a major source of unjustified harms to global 
health. Ending risky meat production would be disruptive to a global industry worth hundreds of 
billions of dollars annually.57 Yet the status quo is already disruptive. Pandemics like COVID-19 
cost economies trillions of dollars.58 
When activities impose impermissible risks on others, a core function of government is to 
find effective measures to limit them. In response to rising levels of vaccine refusal, bans on 
nonmedical exemptions have succeeded in increasing vaccination rates and preventing 
outbreaks.59 Such policies promote the duty to vaccinate and, ideally, there also should be 
policies to promote the duty to avoid most meat. The problem, though, is that far fewer people 
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observe the latter. Since eating meat is such a deeply entrenched practice, laws to discourage it 
could backfire and lead to black markets that are more difficult to regulate.  
Encouragingly, the COVID-19 pandemic bolstered support for limiting the wildlife trade. 
At present, there isn’t similar support for ending other risky practices like CAFOs. But perhaps 
other reforms are possible in the short term, like curtailing the nontherapeutic use of antibiotics 
in farming and higher taxes on meat produced by risky practices.60 These would be welcome 
steps in countries that currently subsidize CAFOs.61 Yet even these reforms will require greater 
popular support than now exists for reducing meat consumption. That obstacle points back to the 
individual duty to avoid most meat sold today. For we only are likely to see meaningful reforms 
as more people embrace this duty and call on others to do the same. Given the incredible harms 
posed by infectious disease, we would be wise to not tarry.  
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